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Abstract
We propose a new primitive that could serve as a component in the
design of block ciphers defined over a vector space of characteristic two.
The primitive consists of squeezing a vectorial non-linear boolean function
between two linear transformations. More precisely, the primitive trans-
formation consists of a (linear compression) → (keyed nonlinear trans-
formation) → (linear decompression) feed back with its input and then
linearly transformed. We impose that the compression and decompression
be perpendicular matrices for the system to be invertible even if the non-
linear part is not invertible. Our scheme has the practical advantage that
many interesting properties of an entire round reduce only to those of the
nonlinear transformation. As a matter of fact, we prove a lower bound on
the minimal number of iterations, assuming independent keys uniformly
distributed among iterations, to avoid paths both in the space of first or-
der differences (differential cryptanalysis) as well as in the space of linear
first order correlations (linear cryptanalysis) up to a desired threshold.
We neither focus in this paper on the key scheduling algorithm nor on the
nonlinear part and solely analyze how the linear components must be set
up to be resilient against the aforementioned cryptanalytic attacks. Our
scheme can be seen as a generalization of several classical block ciphers.
Examples of our scheme are round functions of well-known block ciphers
such as DES or IDEA-NXT based on the Lai-Massey scheme, families of
block ciphers such as the original Feistel networks and generalized Feistel
networks, as long as the underlying field has characteristic two and that
no modular arithmetic is involved.
Keywords: block cipher, differential cryptanalysis, linear cryptanal-
ysis, orthogonal matrices
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we propose a new family of symmetric cryptographic schemes
based on vector spaces built over finite fields of characteristic two. A standard
textbook on the subject is [9], and we refer the readers to [11] for an exhaustive
review of recent research in finite fields. Boolean functions for cryptography are
discussed in [2] and [3].
Every good symmetric scheme contains linear and nonlinear components. In
this paper, we focus solely on the linear components of our scheme assuming
certain properties of the nonlinear component. We indeed separate the linear
and nonlinear parts. The nonlinear part could be for instance built from ideas
in [4]. Our construction sandwiches the nonlinear transformation seen as a
vectorial boolean function between two matrices. The latter matrices could be,
for example, the generator matrix of a linear code, and its corresponding parity
check matrix. We also do not focus on the key scheduling component as we
simply assume identically, independently and uniformly distributed keys over
the keyspace. By assuming i.i.d. keys, we do not indeed decrease the security
since the entropy is higher than when keys are generated by a scheduler with
dependency.
Section 2 introduces the scheme and the notation used in this paper. Sec-
tion 3 contains three subsections, and each contains a result. Subsection 3.1
shows that squeezing a vectorial, and possible non-invertible, nonlinear transfor-
mation between two perpendicular matrices allows for invertibility of the whole
system. The perpendicularity between two matrices here is the one induced by
the vectors that make up the matrices, that is, two matrices are perpendicular
if and only if every row of one matrix is perpendicular to any row of the other
matrix. Subsection 3.2 contains a proof of reduction of the differential and lin-
ear cryptanalysis of one round of our scheme to the cryptanalytic knowledge of
the nonlinear component. Subsection 3.3 contains the proof of lower bounds on
the number of iterations to protect us from differential and linear cryptanalytic
attacks. Section 4 contains some examples among which the Feistel family is
shown to be part of our scheme, and some instance of the Lai-Massey scheme
such as IDEA-NXT. In Section 5 we briefly extend our scheme to include the
generalized Feistel networks as long as the choice of the underlying field is of
characteristic two and does not involved modular arithmetic multiplications.
Conclusions and further work are given in Section 6.
2 Notation and definitions
Let n > 0, N ≥ Ni > 0, and N ≥ No > 0 be integers, V = F
n
2 , and consider the
vectorial function F : V N → V N , introduced in this paper, given by
Fk(x) = T
(
x+Bt
(
fk
(
A(x)
)))
, (1)
where
1. k ∈ K, and K is a vector space over F2, the keyspace with dimK ≥ Nn,
2. fk : V
Ni 7→ V No is a vectorial nonlinear function,
3. T is an invertible matrix of size N ×N over V ,
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4. A is a full rank matrix of size Ni ×N over V ,
5. B is a full rank matrix of size No ×N over V ,
such that the following perpendicularity property holds:
ABt = 0.
Let us denote by Iℓ the ℓ× ℓ identity matrix with entries from F2. For instance,
A can be the generator matrix of an (nN, nNi)-binary linear code written for
simplicity in systematic form as [InNi |M ] = A for some M , and B can be the
parity check matrix [M t|In(N−Ni)] = B. Then, because the characteristic of the
underlying field is two, ABt = 0. We briefly recall at the end of this section
a few concepts on linear codes. We however do not need to restrict ourselves
to matrices arising from binary linear coding theory, as suggested by Method 1
below. Now let us proceed with the following strictly positive quantities:
1. n as the word size,
2. N as the number of words,
3. Ni as the number of input words to fk,
4. No as the number of output words to fk,
5. N
Ni
∈ Q as the compression/contraction factor,
6. N
No
∈ Q as the decompression/expansion factor.
We may sometimes omit explicit reference to the key and write F or f .
For examples about how our scheme generalized other families of symmetric
cryptographic scheme or particular block cipher instances, see Sections 4 and 5.
The following two definitions are for matrices that are central in differential
cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis, and for which we focus in this paper. We
use d instead of n in Definitions 1 and 2 to avoid potential confusion with the
rest of the text.
Definition 1 (Differentials). Given a vectorial boolean function g : Fd12 → F
d2
2
for some d1, d2, and a pair (u, v) ∈ F
d1
2 × F
d2
2 , we denote the differential of g
with respect to (u, v) by δg(u, v) where
δg(u, v) =
1
2d1
∑
x∈F
d1
2
1
{
g(x+ u) + g(x) = v
}
,
where 1 denotes the indicator function.
For more information of differential cryptanalysis, see for instance [1, 5]. It
is understood from now on that when we write differential, we refer to first
order difference as in the usual standard differential cryptanalysis. Similarly if
we write correlation we refer to linear correlation as in the usual linear crypt-
analysis.
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Definition 2 (Linear correlations). Given a vectorial boolean function g :
F
d1
2 → F
d2
2 for some d1, d2, and a pair (u, v) ∈ F
d1
2 × F
d2
2 , we denote correlation
of g with respect to (u, v) by λg(u, v) where
λg(u, v) =
1
2d1
∑
x∈F
d1
2
(−1)(v·g(x)+u·x),
where · denotes the inner product.
For more information on linear (correlation) cryptanalysis, see for instance
[5, 10, 12, 13].
We point out that our scheme is very flexible. We show a simple method to
generate perpendicular sets of vectors.
Method 1. Given integers Ni and No, the following steps generate matrices A
and B such that ABt = 0.
(1) Choose integers ℓ1 > 0, and ℓ2 > 0 such that Ni ≤ 2
ℓ1 , and No ≤ 2
ℓ2 . Let
ℓ = ℓ1 + ℓ2 and let I = {1, . . . , ℓ} be the set of the first ℓ positive integers.
(2) Choose ℓ2 indices among I, say jk for 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ2; let this set be J . Let
W ⊂ Fℓ2 be the set of all ℓ-tuples of F2 such that (w)jk = 0, that is, the jk
coordinate of any vector from W is zero for all 1 ≤ k ≤ ℓ2. The cardinality
of W is 2ℓ1 .
(3) Let W ′ ⊂ Fℓ2 be the set of ℓ-tuples of F2 such that (w)j = 0 whenever
j ∈ I \ J . The cardinality of I \ J is ℓ1 = ℓ− ℓ2. The cardinality of W
′ is
2ℓ2.
(4) Choose Ni vectors from W and No vectors from W
′. Let the rows of A be
the Ni chosen vectors from W so that A ∈ F
Ni×ℓ
2 . Similarly let the rows
of B be the No chosen vectors from W
′ so that B ∈ FNo×ℓ2 .
Clearly for any pair of vectors (w1, w2) ∈ W ×W
′, w1w
t
2 = 0, and so AB
t = 0.
Method 1 may yield matrices that are not full rank and we must check the
full rank property.
For the remaining of this section, we recall some concepts and definitions
from linear coding theory adapted to finite fields of characteristic 2. We also
use a slightly different notation from the previous part of this section to avoid
confusion. A binary (ℓ, k)-linear code is a k-dimensional subspace of the vector
space Fℓ2.
A generator matrix G is any k × ℓ matrix whose rows are a basis for the
code, and therefore v is a codeword if and only if v = uG for some k-tuple u. A
generator matrix is in systematic form if G = [Ik |M ] for some k×(ℓ−k) matrix
M . A parity-check matrix for a linear code is an (ℓ− k)× ℓ matrix H such that
v is a codeword if and only if vHt = 0. If G = [Ik | M ] then H = [M
t | Iℓ−k]
is a parity-check matrix for the code. The dual code of an (ℓ, k)-linear code
is the (ℓ, ℓ − k)-linear code whose generator matrix is a parity check matrix of
the former code. The Hamming distance between two ℓ-tuples is the number of
positions in which they differ. The minimum distance of a code is the smallest
Hamming distance between distinct codewords.
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Now, let G be a k × ℓ matrix with entries in F2. Without loss of generality,
assume ℓ > k and G has full rank. As proven in the subsequent sections, the
reduction of the knowledge of the differentials and correlations of F requires an
ℓ × k matrix R such that GR = Ik. We call such a matrix R, a right inverse
of G. We also denote by 0k the k × k zero square matrix. If G has indeed full
rank, then, for some k × (ℓ − k) matrix U (where U may not be equal to M
as before if G is not a generator matrix arising from a linear code), it can be
reduced uniquely to
G = [Ik | U ]. (2)
Let Rt = [Xt|Y t] for some k× k matrix X , and some (ℓ− k)× k matrix Y . We
have that
GR = Ik if and only if X = Ik + UY.
For cryptographic purposes, Method 1 may not be appropriate. Methods
that generate perpendicular matrices which satisfy the maximum distance sep-
arability (MDS) property might be more suitable. We recall that a matrix
satisfies the MDS property if it satisfies the Singleton bound. Matrices A and B
that satisfy the MDS property and are perpendicular can be obtained from (gen-
eralized) self-dual Reed-Solomon codes. In the literature, the word orthogonal
is sometimes used instead of perpendicular.
Remark 1. When designing F , we require to construct A and B (full rank,
perpendicular) with respective right inverses RA and RB. This allows us to
reduce the differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis of F to those of f
as it becomes clear in the next section. We design F in such a way that RA
and RB exist with their upper block (denoted by X just before) being equal to
Ik or equivalently their lower block (denoted by Y just before) being such that
UY = 0k for k = nNi or k = nNo.
We end this section with a remark that is not important for the rest of this
research paper, but could be important in the design of block ciphers.
Remark 2. We have that A : V N → V Ni , and B : V N → V No , and V is a
vector space of dimension n over F2. The matrices A and B can also be seen as
matrices of dimension nNi × nN and nNo × nN , respectively. For any field F,
we have that Fab×cd ∼= Fac⊗Fbd. The matrix A can be therefore the Kronecker
product of a bit-level matrix and a vector-level matrix, and similarly for B.
Another approach in the design of A and B is to use a subfield expansion of
linear codes. We recall some facts that by themselves explain the idea of subfield
expansion of binary linear codes. If q = 2n and B is a fixed basis of Fq over F2,
any element of Fq can be represented by a row vector of length n over F2. We
have an F2-vector space homomorphism given by B : Fq → F
n
2
def
= V such that
a 7→ B(a). The multiplication by a fixed element b ∈ Fq defines an F2-linear
mapping that can be written as an n× n matrix MB(a) over F2 and such that
B(ab) = B(b)MB(a). The trace function is independent of the choice of the basis
and defines an F2-linear map tr : Fq → F2 given by a 7→ tr(a) =
∑n−1
i=0 a
2i =
tr(MB(a)). Letm be an integer like N , No or Ni given before, for instance. Any
linear transformation L ∈ GL(m,Fq) can be written as B(a) ∈ GL(mn,F2) by
substituting every entry aij of L by MB(aij). Let C be a linear code over Fq
given by the basis B = (b1, . . . , bn) over F2, with parameters [N,m, d] where N
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is the length, m is the dimension, and d is the minimum distance. Then, the
binary expansion of C with respect to B, denoted by B(C) is the linear binary
code with parameters [nN, nm, d′ ≥ d] such that
B(C) =
{
(cij)i,j ∈ F
n
2 |
(
n∑
j=1
c1jbj , . . . ,
n∑
j=1
cNjbj
)
∈ C
}
.
3 Our results
In this section, we first show that in our scheme the perpendicularity property
of the matrices implies the invertibility of the function F . Second, we show how
the cryptanalysis of the differentials or correlations of F reduces to the one of
f . Third, we show how to obtain lower bounds on the number of iterations of
F to guard ourselves from differential and linear cryptanalytic attacks with a
prescribed a priori desired threshold.
3.1 Perpendicularity implies invertibility
In this section, we first show that in our scheme the perpendicularity property
of the matrices A and B implies invertibility of the F even though f is not
invertible.
Lemma 1. The perpendicularity criterion implies the invertibility of F even
though f may not be invertible.
Proof. Let y = F (x). From (1), we obtain T−1y = x + Btf(Ax). Because
ABt = 0, we have AT−1y = Ax, and therefore
x = T−1y +Btf(Ax)
= T−1y +Btf(AT−1y).
Let the inverse of the permutation F be G so that for x ∈ V N , and y = F (x),
G(y) = T−1y +Btf(AT−1y).
Since the characteristic of the underlying field is two, using that ABt = 0, we
have
GF (x) = T−1F (x) +Btf(AT−1F (x))
= T−1
(
T (x+Btf(Ax))
)
+Btf(AT−1T (x+Btf(Ax)))
= x+Btf(Ax) +Btf(A(x+Btf(Ax)))
= x+ 2Btf(Ax)
= x.
3.2 Reducing the differential and linear cryptanalysis
We show here how one can find the differentials and the linear correlations of
F using only those of f . In other words, the differential cryptanalysis and the
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linear cryptanalysis of F solely reduces to those of f . We use the fact that
the matrices A and B are full rank, and have right inverses RA and RB of size
N × Ni and N ×No, respectively. More precisely, ARA is the identity matrix
of size Ni×Ni over V , and BRB is the identity matrix of size No×No over V .
Given a pair (u, v) ∈ V Ni × V No , we recall Definitions (1), (2), and get
δf (u, v) =
1
2nNi
∑
x∈V Ni
1
{
f(x+ u) + f(x) = v
}
,
λf (u, v) =
1
2nNi
∑
x∈V Ni
(−1)(v·f(x)+u·x).
In the following, we denote by rowsp(A) or rowsp(B) the rowspace of A or B,
respectively. We observe that for the correlation coefficients λf , there is no
need to have Ni and No equal: v, f(x) ∈ V
No and so their scalar product is an
element of F2. Similarly, u, x ∈ V
Ni , and so their scalar product is in F2. The
sum of both scalar products u · x and v · f(x) is in F2.
Remark 3. We recall that two functions are affine equivalent if one is equal to
the other composed by affine permutations. When Ni = No, affine equivalence
implies complete knowledge of the differentials and the correlations of F when-
ever those of f are known [3]. In this sense, our next theorem generalizes these
results to the case when Ni is not necessarily equal to No.
Theorem 1. Knowledge of the differentials and correlations of f implies com-
plete knowledge of the differentials and correlations of F . We have that
δF (α, β) =
{
δf (Aα,R
t
B(α+ T
−1β)) if α+ T−1β ∈ rowsp(B),
0 otherwise,
where RB is the right inverse of B, that is, BRB is the identity matrix of size
No ×No over V , and RB is of size N ×No over V . Similarly we have that
λF (α, β) =
{
λf
(
RA
(
α+ T tβ
)
, BT tβ
)
if α+ T tβ ∈ rowsp(A),
0 otherwise,
where RA is the right inverse of A, that is, ARA is the identity matrix of size
Ni ×Ni over V , and RA is of size N ×Ni over V .
Proof. By definition, we have that
δF (α, β) =
1
2nN
∑
x∈V N
1
{
F (x+ α) + F (x) = β}.
Suppose F (x+ α) + F (x) = β, then
β = F (x+ α) + F (x)
= T
(
x+ α+Btf(A(x + α))
)
+ T
(
x+Btf(Ax)
)
= Tα+ TBtf(A(x + α)) + TBtf(Ax)
= Tα+ TBt
(
f(Ax+Aα) + f(Ax)
)
,
which is equivalent to
Bt
(
f(Ax+Aα) + f(Ax)
)
= α+ T−1β.
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Assuming that α + T−1β ∈ rowsp(B) and using the right inverse RB, the
previous equation is equivalent to
RtBB
t
(
f(Ax+Aα) + f(Ax)
)
= RtB
(
α+ T−1β
)
f(Ax+Aα) + f(Ax) = RtB
(
α+ T−1β
)
,
and therefore
δF (α, β) =
1
2nN
∑
x∈V N
1
{
F (x+ α) + F (x) = β}
=
1
2nNi
∑
Ax∈V Ni
1
{
f(Ax+Aα) + f(Ax) = RtB
(
α+ T−1β
)
}
=
1
2nNi
∑
u∈V Ni
1
{
f(u+ a) + f(u) = b
}
,
with u = Ax, a = Aα, and b = RtB
(
α + T−1β
)
. Therefore, δF (α, β) 6= 0 if and
only if α+ T−1β ∈ rowsp(B) and δf(a, b) 6= 0, and the result follows.
For the Hadamard-Walsh coefficient λF (α, β), we have by definition that
λF (α, β) =
1
2nN
∑
x∈V N
(−1)(β·F (x)+α·x).
Thus,
β · F (x) + α · x = β ·
(
T (x+Btf(Ax))
)
+ α · x
= βt
(
T (x+Btf(Ax))
)
+ αtx
=
(
αt + βtT
)
x+ βtTBtf(Ax).
Given u ∈ V Ni , let x = RAu, and, assuming that α+ T
tβ ∈ rowsp(A), we have
β · F (x) + α · x =
(
αt + βtT
)
RAu+ β
tTBtf(u)
=
((
αt + βtT
)
RA
)t
· u+
(
BT tβ
)
· f(u)
= a · u+ b · f(u),
where a = RtA
(
α+ T tβ
)
, and b = BT tβ. Finally,
λF (α, β) =
1
2nN
∑
x∈V N
(−1)β·F (x)+α·x
=
1
2nNi
∑
u∈V Ni
(−1)b·f(u)+a·u
=
{
λf (a, b) if α+ T
tβ ∈ rowsp(A),
0 otherwise.
3.3 An inequality about the number of iterations
In what follows, we refer to ℓ as the number of iterations or rounds with some
interesting ℓ to be specified later. Suppose that we are given an arbitrary input
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x ∈ V N and a sequence k ∈ Kℓ of ℓ independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) keys from the uniform distribution. We write k = (k0, . . . , kℓ−1) ∈ K
ℓ.
The values of x and k uniquely define the sequence
x→ Fk0(x)→ Fk1 ◦ Fk0(x)→ · · · → Fkℓ−1 ◦ · · · ◦ Fk0(x), (3)
where ◦ denotes the usual composition of functions. An attacker is interested
in a deterministic sequence (αi)
ℓ
i=0, with say α0 = α, αℓ = β, and
αi+1 = Fki ◦ · · · ◦ Fk0(x+ α0) + Fki ◦ · · · ◦ Fk0 (x) (4)
which yields non zero differential trails that is such that
∏ℓ−1
i=0 δFki (αi, αi+1) > 0.
A goal of a designer is to avoid with the highest possible probability the existence
of sequences for which
∏ℓ−1
i=0 δFki (αi, αi+1) is high. Theorems 2 and 3 give
interesting upper bounds for the product of differential probabilities and for the
product of linear correlations respectively, assuming the knowledge of the latter
for the nonlinear part and whenever the key ki’s are chosen randomly identically
and independently according to the uniform distribution. We observe that the
upper bounds immediately lead to lower bounds on the number of rounds ℓ
required to avoid differential and linear cryptanalytic attacks up to a prescribed
a priori desired threshold.
To avoid confusion we make two separate theorems for which their proof is
rather similar although very instructive in their own as pointed out in Remark
4. So let us start with a theorem about the differential cryptanalysis.
Theorem 2. Given ℓ as before with the deterministic choice of α0 ∈ ker(A),
αj = T
jα0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ, let M be such that
n(N −M) = dim
(
ℓ−1⋂
j=0
T jkerA
)
,
and let 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 be
δ = max
{
δfk(Ax, 0): k ∈ K,x ∈ V
N
}
.
Then we have
ℓ−1∏
j=0
δFkj (αj , αj+1) =
ℓ−1∏
j=0
δfkj (AT
jα0, 0) ≤ δ
N−M
Ni .
Proof. The first step yields α1 = Tα0 + TB
ty for some y ∈ V No . We ob-
serve that 0 ∈ rowsp(B) and the case y = 0 corresponds to a case with
α0 ∈ kerA. Thus with the deterministic choice α0 ∈ ker(A) and from The-
orem 1, δFk0 (α0, α1) = δfk0 (u, v) with u = Aα0 and v = R
t
B(α0 + T
−1α1) = 0.
The differential probability δfk0 (Aα0, 0) might be zero actually or might not,
but this concerns the non linear part which we do not deal with in this paper.
The second step yields α2 = Tα1 + TB
t
(
fk1(Ax1 +Aα1) + fk1(Ax1)
)
. Sup-
pose the choice of α0 ∈ kerA was made for the first step so to render the
deterministic relation between α1 and α0 which is α1 = Tα0, and a non zero
differential unless, as mentioned previously, δfk0 (Aα0, 0) = 0 itself. We have at
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this step α1 = Tα0 ∈ T ker(A). To go to the next step, let us take α1 ∈ ker(A)
so that it yields a deterministic relation between α2 and α1, namely α2 = Tα1.
From here, we have α1 ∈ T ker(A) ∩ ker(A), α0 ∈ ker(A).
If we repeat the argument with
αi+1 ∈
i⋂
j=0
T j kerA, αi+1 = Tαi, and 0 ≤ i ≤ ℓ− 1,
then we construct a deterministic sequence with
ℓ−1∏
i=0
δFki (αi, αi+1) =
ℓ−1∏
i=0
δfki (Aαi, 0) =
ℓ−1∏
i=0
δfki (AT
iα0, 0) ≥ 0.
An important aspect to point out when attacking a scheme is to check for
the existence of fixed points that is if there is x ∈ kerA such that Tx = x. In
that case, we always have for all i > 0 that
{0, x} ⊂
i⋂
j=0
T j kerA.
For j ≥ 0, let Mj be such that
nN − nMj = dim(T
j kerA) ≥ nN − nNi = dim(kerA),
and therefore
codim(T j kerA) = nMj ≤ codim(kerA) = nNi.
We observe that M0 = Ni. Now by M , as in the statement of the theorem, we
have that
nN − nM = codim
(
ℓ−1⋂
j=0
T jkerA
)
≤
ℓ−1∑
j=0
codim
(
T jkerA
)
≤
ℓ−1∑
i=0
nNi = (nNi)ℓ.
We finally obtain
ℓ ≥
N −M
Ni
that completes the proof using the definition of δ.
Let us finish this section with a theorem on linear cryptanalysis.
Theorem 3. Given ℓ as before with the deterministic choice of α0 ∈ kerB,
αj =
(
T t
)−j
α0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ, let M
⋆ be such that
n(N −M⋆) = dim
(
ℓ−1⋂
j=0
(T t)j kerB
)
,
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and let 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 be
λ = max
{
|λfk (Bx, 0)| : k ∈ K,x ∈ V
N
}
.
Then we have∣∣∣∣
ℓ−1∏
j=0
λFkj (αj , αj+1)
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣
ℓ−1∏
j=0
λfkj (B
(
T t
)−j
α0, 0)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ λN−M⋆No .
Proof. The first step consists of a choice of α0 ∈ V
N and a deterministic choice
of α1 ∈ V
N that satisfies for all x0 ∈ V
N and k0 ∈ K the following equation:
0 = α1 ·
(
T
(
x0 +B
tfk0(Ax0)
))
+ α0 · x0. (5)
Then from (5), we have
0 = T tα1 · x0 + T
tα1 ·B
tfk0(Ax0) + α0 · x0
0 = (T tα1 · x0 + α0 · x0
)
+ T tBα1 · fk0(Ax0). (6)
To satisfy (6) deterministically, we choose α0 = T
tα1, and α1 ∈ kerB. We have
de facto that α0 ∈ T
t kerB.
For the second step, we have to satisfy
0 = α2 ·
(
T
(
x1 +B
tfk1(Ax1)
))
+ α1 · x1,
for some x1 ∈ V
N and for all k1 ∈ K. We now choose α1 = T
tα2 and α2 ∈
ker(B).
Combining conditions under which we make choice from the first and second
steps, we have that α1 ∈ kerB ∩ T
t kerB.
Repeating the preceding argument, we obtain
αi+1 ∈
i⋂
j=0
(
T t
)j
kerB, αi = T
tαi+1, 0 ≤ i ≤ ℓ− 1,
which we combine with Theorem 1 to obtain a deterministic sequence with∣∣∣∣
ℓ−1∏
i=0
λFki (αi, αi+1)
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣
ℓ−1∏
i=0
λfki (Bαi, 0)
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣
ℓ−1∏
i=0
λfki
(
B
(
T t
)−i
α0, 0
)∣∣∣∣ ≥ 0.
In a way almost similar to Theorem 2, we can complete the proof using similar
well known relations about the (co)dimension of the corresponding subspaces.
Remark 4. We see a sort of duality in our scheme when we compare the proofs
for the differential cryptanalysis and the linear cryptanalysis. For Theorem 1,
the rowsp(A) and ker(B) matter for the linear cryptanalysis while rowsp(B) and
ker(A) matter for the differential cryptanalysis. The duality is enforced when A
is the generator matrix of a linear code C, and B is the parity matrix (generator
matrix for the dual code). If C is self-dual, then Ni = No, A = B, AB
t = 0, and
necessarily kerA = kerB together with rowspA = rowspB. Analysis for the
differentials and for the correlations are almost the same except for the choice
that αi+1 = Tαi for the differentials and αi = T
tαi+1 for the correlations. We
get a bonus in terms of kernel computations.
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4 Examples
One goal of this research is to focus on the linear matrices of our new general
scheme, and therefore, in the next examples, we do not explicitly recall the
nonlinear parts. Existing schemes other than those mentioned in the following
examples can also be found to be special case of our scheme. Example 1 shows
how our scheme encapsulates the original family of Feistel block ciphers. Exam-
ple 2 shows a more specific instance which is the FOX block cipher. Example 3
shows what happens when the nonlinear part is made linear.
Example 1 (Feistel block cipher family). Feistel block ciphers form a family
of symmetric block ciphers. We show in this example that they can be seen as
a subfamily of our scheme. In fact, with Ni = No = 1, N = 2Ni = 2No, fk can
be specified to design particular instances of a Feistel network such as DES. An
input x is a pair represented as a column vector
x =
(
x0
x1
)
with x0, x1 ∈ F
n
2 , and similarly for an output vector. The nonlinear function
fk is defined over F
n
2 . If I and 0 are respectively the n × n identity and zero
matrices, then the transformations A, B, and T are respectively given by
A =
(
I 0
)
, B =
(
0 I
)
, and T =
(
0 I
I 0
)
.
Finally we have that
Fk(x) = Fk
(
x0
x1
)
=
(
0 I
I 0
)((
x0
x1
)
+
(
0
I
)
fk
((
I 0
)( x0
x1
)))
=
(
x1 + fk(x0)
x0
)
.

Another example is IDEA NXT that uses the Lai-Massey scheme [8] as a
building primitive.
Example 2 (IDEA NXT–FOX). Here n = 16 or n = 32, and N = 4, Ni =
No = 2. An input is written as (L0, L1, R0, R1) ∈ V
N where V = Fn2 , Li ∈ V ,
Ri ∈ V for i = 0, 1. The matrix templates for A, B, and T are given by
A =
(
I 0 I 0
0 I 0 I
)
, B = A, T =


0 I 0 0
I I 0 0
0 0 I 0
0 0 0 I

 .
The nonlinear keyed function fk : V
2 7→ V 2 is as given in [7] with k ∈ V N .
Let (z0, z1)
t = fk(y0, y1)
t for z0, z1, y0, and y1 ∈ V . Given an input x =
(L0, L1, R0, R1)
t and a round key k, one round of FOX is given by
Fk(x) = T
(
x+Btfk(Ax)
)
= T
(
x+Btfk
(
L0 +R0
L1 +R1
))
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= T




L0
L1
R0
R1

+


I 0
0 I
I 0
0 I


(
z0
z1
) =


z1 + L1
z0 + z1 + L0 + L1
z0 +R0
z1 +R1

 .

Example 3 (Linear case). Suppose Ni = No = 1, and n = 2, then the only
possible case for fk is the swap permutation xored to k. We have therefore
fk(x0, x1) =
(
x1 + k0
x0 + k1
)
= S
(
x0
x1
)
+
(
k0
k1
)
,
where
S =
(
0 1
1 0
)
.
Since n = 2, we have here that V = F22. Also N ≥ 1, and for v ∈ V
N , the matrix
A represents a linear compression map V N → V such that v 7→ Av. We can
think of (x0, x1)
t above as being the image of an element v under A. Similarly
B is a matrix representing a linear decompression map V → V N . Here we still
need the requirement that ABt = 0. We denote by C and D the matrices such
that
C = T (I +BtSA) and D = TBt.
Then for a key k
Fk(x) = T
(
x+Bt
(
SAx+ k
))
= T
(
(I +BtSA)x+Btk
)
= Cx+Dk.
Given a sequence of ℓ keys ki ∈ F
2
2 for 0 ≤ i ≤ ℓ − 1, it is easy to find Fkℓ−1 ◦
· · · ◦ Fk1 ◦ Fk0(x) since
Fkℓ−1 ◦ · · · ◦ Fk0 (x) = C
ℓx+
ℓ−1∑
i=0
CiDkℓ−1−i.
With two outputs Fkℓ−1 ◦ · · · ◦ Fk0 (xa) and Fkℓ−1 ◦ · · · ◦ Fk0(xb), we can learn
xa + xb easily. 
5 Embedding generalized Feistel networks
Hoang and Rogaway [6] consider several well-known types of generalized Feistel
networks including: (a) unbalanced Feistel networks (in which we may have
n 6= m for the n-bit to m-bit round functions), (b) alternating Feistel networks
(in which round functions alternate between contraction and expansion), and
(c) Type-1, Type-2, and Type-3 Feistel networks (in which the n-bit to n-bit
round functions encipher (kn)-bit strings for k ≥ 2).
We can reexpress all non-numeric generalized Feistel networks in our scheme,
balanced or unbalanced. In Example 4 below, we show how to embed a general-
ized Feistel network cipher of Type-1 constructed over F2. We suggest the reader
uses [6, Figure 1], where the designs of several generalized Feistel networks are
given, as companion of the examples below.
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Example 4 (A generalized Feistel network of Type-1). We have V = Fn2 , I
and 0 are respectively the n× n identity and zero matrices, the four-block input
(x1, x2, x3, x4) with xi ∈ V , and non-linear part f such that f : V → V . We
note that in [6], capital F denotes a smaller non-linear function which is denoted
f by us. Then, the template matrices for one round of the Type-1 Feistel are
reexpressed in our scheme as follows:
A =
(
I 0 0 0
)
,
B =
(
0 I 0 0
)
,
T =


0 I 0 0
0 0 I 0
0 0 0 I
I 0 0 0

 .

From [6], alternating Feistel and unbalanced Feistel can be also embedded
in our scheme with minor changes. For alternating Feistel, we use two instances
of A, B, T and f . Our scheme allows f to be non-invertible and hence include
unbalanced Feistel.
It is interesting that Type-2 and Type-3 generalized Feistel networks do not
fit in our model as presented so far. However, we can expand our scheme so to
include such networks. For brevity, we show this only for Type-3 generalized
Feistel networks; Type-2 can be easily derived by simplifying the Type-3 model.
Example 5 (A generalized Feistel network of Type-3). For a Type-3 Feistel
network, the permutation in (1) can be extended to F˜k : V
3N → V 3N as follows.
First, for j = 1, 2, 3, let fj : V → V be the 3 non-linear functions. Then,
again for j = 1, 2, 3, let the matrices Aj ’s and Bj’s be of size N × 3N . Then,
F˜k : V
3N → V 3N becomes:
F˜k

 xx
x

 =

 T 0 00 T 0
0 0 T





 xx
x

+ 3∑
j=1
Btjfj

Aj

 xx
x





 , (7)
where
(
xt xt xt
)t
is the concatenation of x three times. The matrices rep-
resenting the linear maps are:
A1 =
(
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
)
,
B1 =
(
0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
)
,
A2 =
(
0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0
)
,
B2 =
(
0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0
)
,
A3 =
(
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0
)
,
B3 =
(
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I
)
.

The results of Section 3 apply here almost immediately. As expected smaller
lower bounds on the number of iterations yield one third of the bounds of the
usual classic Feistel network.
14
6 Conclusion and further work
We design a new block cipher scheme which squeezes a nonlinear transformation
between two perpendicular matrices, for instance the generator matrix of a
linear code and its parity check matrix. This construction allows us to reduce
the differential and linear cryptanalyses of an entire round function to only the
nonlinear component. Also we show a lower bound on the number of iterations
to prevent differential and linear cryptanalytic attacks up to a certain threshold.
Our scheme generalizes several classical block ciphers. Further work include
cataloging major past and current schemes that fit within our scheme as well as
developing new block ciphers arising from our general framework. We also plan
to study other properties such as those study in [4], that is, the number of terms
in the algebraic normal forms of the output bits, the algebraic degrees of the
latter given the knowledge of those for the nonlinear component, and the cycle
structure of one iteration or possibly many iterations assuming i.i.d. uniform
keys. Other potential future work include the study of statistical properties
proper to random walks arising from multiple iterations.
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